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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jason Ellsworth Coapland appeals from his conviction for aggravated battery.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Coapland was waiting in line to get into the Interfaith Sanctuary homeless shelter
when he got into an argument with another person. (Tr., p.107, Ls.9-14; p.108, Ls.1-17.)
The argument began as a verbal exchange but at some point Coapland produced a knife.
(Tr., p.111, Ls.6-12; p.112, Ls.7-17; p.116, Ls.21-24.) Concerned for his safety, the other
individual pushed Coapland “to get [Coapland] away from him,” and Coapland stabbed
the individual in the stomach. (Tr., p.117, L.1 – p.121, L.4.) The state subsequently
charged Coapland with aggravated battery and the use of a deadly weapon during the
commission of a crime, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.35-36, 57-58.)
On the day of trial, the state noted that it “did not anticipate any evidence of selfdefense coming in in its case in chief whatsoever.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-13.) The state
accordingly requested that “unless the Defense has a good faith basis that that will come
in in some way,” that self-defense should “not be mentioned in opening statement.” (Tr.,
p.7, Ls.13-16.) The district court stated that:
THE COURT: Well, unless—yeah, unless there is a good faith basis for
making a claim it shouldn’t be addressed in opening statements.
I haven’t put it in the drafts. I always—you have my draft, probable draft
instructions already on your desk. And I haven’t put it in yet because I do
always need to listen to the evidence to see if it’s a viable claim. If it’s a
viable claim, of course, I will instruct on it. If it’s not, we’ll take it up
later.
(Tr., p.7, L.17 – p.8, L.1.)
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The state’s first witness was a detective who was the first officer at the scene.
(Tr., pp.74-103.) As it turned out, the detective was responding to an unrelated call and
just happened to be walking through the alley next to the Interfaith Sanctuary. (Tr., p.76,
L.19 – p. 77, L.4; p.79, L.5 – p.80, L.2.) The detective described walking through the
fenced alleyway, where on the other side of the fence, “50 or so people” were waiting in
line to get into the Sanctuary:
And as I was coming up to here, I was about 15 feet from the end of this
fence, which has a green wind screen in it, about 15 feet into this when I
heard an uproar. Was very angry. It was aggressive. It was very sudden.
(Tr., p.80, Ls.10-14.) The state inquired: “Were you able to make out any of the words
that were being said specifically?” (Tr. p.15, Ls.15-16.) Coapland objected to this
question on hearsay grounds (Tr., p.15, Ls.17-18), but the district court overruled the
objection:
THE COURT: It’s not hearsay if he is describing what he actually
observed and heard, and he’s describing a situation where he is hearing an
uproar. So it is both present sense impression and it’s also not hearsay. I
suppose you refer to him as an ear witness. So please proceed.
(Tr., p.80, Ls.19-25). The detective proceeded to testify that “everything was quiet as I
was walking up,” and that he “didn’t notice or hear anything.” (Tr., p.81, Ls.3-5.)
However, when the detective “got to about 15 feet from there it was a very sudden uproar.
It was very angry. There was one female voice that said something very consistent with
you didn’t have to do that.” (Tr., p.81, Ls.5-9.) The detective also testified that “[i]t was
just an angry sudden uproar.” (Tr., p.81, L.11.) After looking for the cause of the
commotion the detective found the defendant on the ground, holding a knife. (Tr., p.81,
L.24 – p. 82, L.6; p.84, L.15 – p.85, L.1.)
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The state called the victim as a witness. (Tr., pp.104-42.) The victim testified
that he was waiting in line, outside of the Sanctuary, when he noticed Coapland pouring a
beer into a cup. (Tr., p.108, L.5 – p.109, L.4.) As “a courtesy,” the victim informed
Coapland that “if he was seen drinking outside the Sanctuary they weren’t going to let
him stay the night.” (Tr., p.109, Ls.9-14.) This upset Coapland, and the victim testified
that they “got in a back and forth argument,” and that “it got heated.” (Tr., p.109, Ls.2425; p.111, Ls.6-12.)
The victim testified that Coapland implied “that he wanted to engage in a fight.”
(Tr., p.112, Ls.7-17; p.132, Ls.3-22.) So the victim “walked away from the situation” and
smoked a cigarette, before returning to his place in line in front of Coapland, where the
victim testified he could “feel that there was something wrong.” (Tr., p.112, Ls.12-21;
p.114, L.8 – p.115, L.22.)
At this point the victim noticed that Coapland had a knife—the victim testified
Coapland had the knife “readied,” and “[y]ou could tell he was putting strength in to it.”
(Tr., p.116, Ls.21-24; p.119, Ls.2-9.) The victim testified that because he was “concerned
for [his] safety,” he pushed Coapland away in an attempt “to get [Coapland] away from”
him. (Tr., p.119, Ls.13-22.) Coapland then “swung [the knife] with his left hand,” and
the victim, who “knew the blade was coming,” punched Coapland. (Tr., p.117, L.14;
p.120, L.14 – p.121, L.1.) The victim “caught [the knife] in [his] gut” and was severely
injured; he testified that “[t]he next thing that I remember is looking down and then
seeing that my small intestine was protruding from my body,” which ultimately required
emergency abdominal surgery and some internal “rearrangement” to repair. (Tr., p.121,
Ls.1-4; p.123, L.10 – p.124, L.1; p.136, Ls.3-7; p.151, L.5 – p.154, L.3.)
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The state also called a friend of the victim, who was also at the Sanctuary that day,
to testify. (Tr., pp.163-72.) The friend watched Coapland and the victim “yelling at each
other” and kept his “eyes on them the whole time” as he heard them yelling (See Tr.,
p.166, Ls.6-9; 167, Ls.5-10), and testified that he saw Coapland “taking a swing at [the
victim] and then [the victim] responded in self-defense” (Tr., p.167, Ls.11-15). While
the friend could not initially see anything in Coapland’s hand, he saw him swing and
“make contact with [the victim’s] gut,” and testified that thereafter the victim audibly
yelled “oh, my gosh, I’ve been stabbed. My guts, my guts are falling out.” (Tr., p.167,
L.21 – p.168, L.21.)
Coapland testified. (Tr., pp.199-219.) He did not, however, testify that he had
any recollection of the stabbing or the events surrounding it. (See generally, Tr., pp.199219.) Attributing his faulty memory to purported repeated brain injuries (see, e.g., Tr.,
p.204, L.12 – p.205, L.18; p.211, Ls.1-3; p.216, L.21 – p.217, L.8; p.219, Ls.7-14),
Coapland testified that he had no memory of the day of the incident, save for one
unrelated recollection of getting coffee and a bag lunch at church (Tr., p.203, Ls.11-23;
p.205, Ls.19-22; p.206, L.18 – p.207, L.2). Coapland further testified that he had no
recollection of how he got to the Sanctuary (Tr., p.205, Ls.23-25); that he “maybe”
consumed two beers that day (Tr., p.210, Ls.23-25); that he did not know if the victim
had been “bugging” him (Tr., p.212, L.25 – p.213, L.7); that he did not “have any
memory” of being at the Sanctuary (Tr., p.215, Ls.20-23); and did not “have any idea that
I was there” (Tr., p.216, Ls.3-25).
Coapland did, however, testify regarding his belief that the stabbing would only
have been done in self-defense:
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Q. Okay. Now, I know you don’t remember. This is what you said is you
don’t remember anything past leaving the church on January 30. But
you’ve heard testimony about that evening about you pulling a knife out
on January 30. Why would you have pulled a knife out? I know you don’t
remember. But based on prior experience, why would you pull out a knife?
A. Well, although I don’t remember, in my life’s history, I’m 45 years old,
a knife used as utility reasons, there is no possible way on earth in my
lifetime that I would pull a weapon for any other reason unless I was under
physical threat.
Period.
(Tr., p.207, L.24 – p.208, L.12.)
Prior to jury deliberations, Coapland moved for a self-defense jury instruction.
(Tr., p.226, Ls.17-24.) Coapland’s counsel argued that “there is a good faith basis based
on Mr. Coapland’s testimony regarding the only reason he would pull a knife is in fear of
threat,” and that “I think [Coapland] has established that he—had he remembered, if he
had pulled out the knife, it would have been in self-defense.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.20-24.) The
court denied the request:
You know, I think that requires a real level of speculation to say “had I
remembered” because it is pretty clear he doesn’t remember. And there’s
no other evidence of anything that would warrant a self-defense
instruction. So I do not think the evidence is sufficient to justify presenting
the issue of self-defense to the jury.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I am going to deny that request.
(Tr., p.226, L.25 - p.227, L.9.)
The jury found Coapland guilty of aggravated battery and use of a deadly weapon
in the commission of a crime (Tr., p.253, L.24 – p.254, L.16), and Coapland admitted to
the persistent violator enhancement (Tr., p.255, L.6 – p.258, L.2).
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Coapland was

sentenced to 20 years imprisonment with seven years fixed, from which he timely
appeals. (R., pp.169-75.)
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ISSUES
Coapland states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Detective
Pietrzak to testify that he heard an unidentified female say “you
didn’t have to do that,” as the statement was hearsay and was not
admissible pursuant to any exception to the hearsay rule?

II.

Did the district court err in failing to instruct the jury on selfdefense?

III.

Did the accumulation of errors deprive Mr. Coapland of his right to
a fair trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Coapland failed to show the district court erred in admitting the statement, or
alternatively, was any error harmless?

II.

Has Coapland failed to show the district court erred by not giving the jury a selfdefense instruction?

III.

Has Coapland failed to show cumulative error?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Coapland Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Admitting The “You Didn’t
Have To Do That” Statement; Alternatively, Any Error Was Harmless
A.

Introduction
Coapland contends the district court erred by allowing the detective to testify he

heard a woman in the crowd exclaim “you didn’t have to do that,” because: 1) contrary to
the district court’s holding, the statement was hearsay, and 2) it was not admissible
hearsay under the present-sense impression exception. (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-19.)
Coapland fails to show reversible error. While the “you didn’t have to do that”
statement was hearsay, and likely inadmissible as a present-sense impression, it
nevertheless would have been admissible as an excited utterance. Alternatively, even if
the court erred by admitting the statement into evidence, any such error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The trial court’s judgment concerning admission of evidence shall ‘only be

disturbed on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’” State v. Hill, 161
Idaho 444, 447, 387 P.3d 112, 115 (2016) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218,
245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (quoting State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694
(1992))). Idaho’s appellate courts consider three factors to determine whether a trial court
abused its discretion:
(1) [W]hether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.

8

Hill, 161 Idaho 444, 447, 387 P.3d 112, 115 (quoting Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). “[T]he interpretation of
a rule of evidence, like the interpretation of a statute, is reviewed de novo.” Id. (quoting
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998).

C.

The Detective’s Testimony About The “You Didn’t Have To Do That” Statement
Would Have Been Admissible As An Excited Utterance
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at

the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E.
801. Hearsay is generally inadmissible. 1 I.R.E. 802; State v. Conner, 161 Idaho 502,
505, 387 P.3d 170, 173 (Ct. App. 2016).
However, hearsay may be admitted as an “excited utterance” where the “testimony
recounts ‘[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’” State v. Hansen, 133
Idaho 323, 325, 986 P.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting I.R.E. 803(2)). A statement
must meet two requirements to qualify as an excited utterance: “[f]irst, there must be a
startling event that renders inoperative the normal reflective thought process of the
observer, and second, the declarant’s statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that
event rather than the result of reflective thought.” Hansen, 133 Idaho at 325, 986 P.2d at
348; State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 4, 730 P.2d 921, 924 (1986); State v. Burton, 115 Idaho
1154, 1156, 772 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Ct. App. 1989). Whether a statement is an excited
utterance depends on the totality of the circumstances, including “the amount of time that

1

The state would agree that the officer’s testimony, quoting the “you didn’t have to do
that” statement, was hearsay.
9

elapsed between the startling event and the statement, the nature of the condition or event,
the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or absence of self-interest, and
whether the statement was volunteered or made in response to a question.” Hansen, 133
Idaho at 325, 986 P.2d at 348 (citing 31 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6753, at 275-76 (Interim ed.1997)).
Here, the statement “you didn’t have to do that,” while hearsay, would
nevertheless have been admissible as an excited utterance. The detective who overheard
the statement testified that as he initially walked through the alley, “everything was
quiet,” and that he “didn’t notice or hear anything.” (Tr., p.81, Ls.3-5.) When the officer
was about 15 feet from the Sanctuary fence and the approximately “50 or so people”
inside it, he “heard an uproar,” which he characterized as “aggressive,” “very angry,” and
“very sudden.” (Tr., p.80, Ls.5-14.) The officer explained what he heard in detail:
When I got to about 15 feet from it there was a very sudden uproar. It was
very angry. There was one female voice that said something very
consistent with you didn’t have to do that. There was a lot of—there was,
you know, people calling somebody a fucker. It was just an angry sudden
uproar.
(Tr., p.81, Ls.5-11.) The officer also testified that he heard one female say “you better not
have stabbed him.” (Tr., p.96, Ls.1-2.) The crowd had initially formed “an expanding
circle of people getting away, still angry, pointing,” but once the crowd “kind of cleared”
from the scene, the officer was able to “figure it out”: he “look[ed] down and there [was]
an adult male sitting on the ground.” (Tr., p.82, Ls.2-4; p.84, Ls.14-20.) That person was
the defendant, holding a knife. (Tr., p.84, L.21 – p.85, L.6.)
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the “you didn’t have to do that”
statement was an excited utterance. A physical altercation, followed by a stabbing that
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resulted in the victim’s “small intestine” visibly “protruding from [his] body” (Tr., p.121,
Ls.1-4), would be a “startling event” for nearby witnesses, by any standard. Even those in
the group who did not see the stabbing would have no doubt been startled by the victim’s
proclamation that “oh, my gosh, I’ve been stabbed. My guts, my guts are falling out”—
which was “yelled … out where everybody can hear it.” (Tr., p.168, Ls.15-21 (emphasis
added).)
Moreover, the officer’s testimony that he heard one voice in the uproar say “you
better not have stabbed him” (Tr., p.96, Ls.1-2), verifies the common-sense intuition that
the uproar was in response to the stabbing, as opposed to being in response to the pushing
of Coapland, or in response to some other coincidentally shocking, yet completely
unrelated event (see Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18 (“Perhaps the unidentified female felt
that someone else in the group did something that he or she did not have to do that had
nothing to do with [the] stabbing.”)).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, a statement heard in a “very
sudden” uproar would by definition be a spontaneous outburst that is not the product of
reflective thought. The “very angry,” “very aggressive” character of the uproar likewise
shows the statements comprising it were emotional and non-deliberative (and indicates
the stress that caused them). Further, while the detective did not know specifically who
said “you didn’t have to do that,” it is apparent that person lacked self-interest insofar as
she was a female—and Coapland, the victim, and the victim’s “personal friend” who
testified at trial were all males. (See Tr., p.81, Ls.7-9; p.163, L.19 – p.164, L.3.) In light
of the totality of the circumstances, because the “you didn’t have to do that” statement
was made shortly after a self-evidently startling attack, and was part of the sudden, angry,
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and aggressive uproar of voices that came in its aftermath, it would have been an
admissible excited utterance.
Admittedly, the district court did not make a ruling that the statement was an
excited utterance. (See Tr., p.80, Ls.19-25 (ruling that the statement was a present-sense
impression, or alternatively, not hearsay).) However, because the statement would have
been admissible as an excited utterance, the court’s decision to admit it—while premised
on an incorrect theory—was ultimately correct. Where a district court arrives at the
correct result, albeit based on an incorrect theory, Idaho’s appellate courts will uphold the
correct result. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017).
While the Garcia-Rodriguez Court declined to apply the “right result-wrong theory” rule
on “issues neither raised nor argued below,” that should not foreclose upholding the
correct result here. See id. at __, 396 P.3d at 705. Below, immediately following the
objection, the district court analyzed the issue, made a ruling, and ordered the questioning
to continue, before the state could raise any further issues. (Tr., p.80, Ls.15-25.) As a
result, the state did not have the opportunity to respond to the hearsay objection and point
out the theories upon which the statement could be admitted. Because the statement
would have been admissible as an excited utterance, this Court should affirm the court’s
ruling by applying the correct legal standard. State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 785-87, 391
P.3d 1252, 1255-57 (2017) (deciding whether evidence was correctly admitted over
hearsay objection based on “applicable law,” regardless of fact that neither party argued
the particular hearsay objection below or on appeal).
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D.

Even If Erroneously Admitted, The Statement Was Harmless
In the case of an objected-to trial error, the state has “the burden of demonstrating

that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 221-22, 245
P.3d at 973-74. To do so, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict.” Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
In the alternative, even if the “you didn’t have to do that” statement was
erroneously admitted, any such error was harmless. The state presented overwhelming
evidence that Coapland committed an aggravated assault, including the victim’s
testimony (Tr., pp.104-42); eyewitness testimony (Tr., pp.163-72); the treating surgeon’s
testimony (Tr., pp.143-163); pictures of the victim’s lasting disfigurement after surgery
(State’s Exs. 5-6); and the knife itself (Tr., p.186, L.12 – p.187, L.20). Coapland’s
defense did not cast any doubt on the relevant points of the state’s case; Coapland simply
testified that he had zero recollection of what happened during the altercation, but that
“there is no possible way on earth in my lifetime that I would pull a weapon for any other
reason unless I was under physical threat.” (See, e.g., Tr., p.203, L.11 – p.204, L.2;
p.205, Ls.19-25; p.208, Ls.9-11; p.216, Ls.16-25.) In particular, no evidence, beyond
Coapland’s hypothetical suppositions, supported a theory that Coapland unwillingly or
otherwise lawfully stabbed his victim. The record therefore does not show that the “you
didn’t have to do that statement” contributed to the verdict—or that without that
statement the jury would have concluded that Coapland acted lawfully.
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The state presented ample evidence that Coapland committed an aggravated
battery by willfully and unlawfully stabbing the victim.

Accordingly, any error in

admitting the “you didn’t have to do that” statement was harmless.

II.
Coapland Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Not Giving The Jury A SelfDefense Instruction
A.

Introduction
Coapland argues the district court erred by not giving the jury a self-defense

instruction, because there was “some” evidence that supported giving such an instruction
(Appellant’s brief, p.22), and the failure to give the instruction was not harmless
(Appellant’s brief, pp.23-24). Coapland is not entitled to relief because he has failed to
demonstrate he was entitled to such an instruction. Alternatively, even if the court erred
by not giving the jury a self-defense instruction, any such error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691,
694 (1992); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000). A
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous statement of the law, is
not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible comment on the evidence, or is
adequately covered by other instructions. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d
1327, 1335 (1987); State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 632-33, 38 P.3d 1285, 1288-89 (Ct.
App. 2002); State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 2000).
Whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports an instruction is a matter within the
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trial court’s discretion. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997);
State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878, 920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996).

C.

Coapland Was Not Entitled To A Self-Defense Instruction
A district court may refuse a requested jury instruction if it is not supported by the

evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987); State v.
Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669-70, 726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct. App. 1986) (self-defense
instruction not supported by evidence). To be entitled to an instruction on an affirmative
defense, a defendant must “present facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant
to [the] defense.” State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App.
2000).
To make such a case for a self-defense instruction, a defendant must demonstrate
from the record “evidence of reasonable fear of some level of bodily harm,” State v.
Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 329, 986 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 1999), and that the defendant
“used reasonable force to resist the use of excessive force.” State v. Garner, 159 Idaho
896, ___, 367 P.3d 720, 724-25 (Ct. App. 2016) (emphasis added); see also State v.
Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 670, 726 P.2d 772, 782 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Scroggins, 91
Idaho 847, 849, 433 P.2d 117, 119 (1967) (“Such test is not designed to require detached
reflection from the victim, but rather is designed to prevent excessive force under the
circumstances on the part of the person claiming self-defense. It thus is a protective
measure for the original aggressor-victim. It merely requires that the conduct employed
by one who claims self-defense be reasonable.”).
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Here, a review of the record shows that the district court properly rejected the
requested self-defense instruction because it was not supported by evidence. Coapland
did not testify that he acted in self-defense (see generally Tr., pp.199-219), nor did any
other witness to the stabbing testify that he acted in self-defense (see generally Tr.,
pp.104-42; pp.163-72). Indeed, Coapland’s request was based solely on speculation
about why he would have done the thing he did not remember doing: “I believe there is a
good faith basis based on Mr. Coapland’s testimony regarding the only reason he would
pull a knife is in fear of threat. I think he has established that he—had he remembered, if
he had pulled out the knife, it would have been in self-defense.” (Tr., p.226, Ls.17-24
(emphasis added).)

The district court correctly rejected this question-begging

hypothetical, because “it is pretty clear [Coapland] doesn’t remember.” (Tr., p.226, L.25
– p.227, L.7.)
Because there was no evidence showing that Coapland actually had a reasonable
fear of bodily harm, or that stabbing the victim was a reasonable response to such a fear,
there was no evidence to substantiate a self-defense claim. See Hansen, 133 Idaho at 329,
986 P.2d at 352; Garner, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 724-25. The district court,
therefore, correctly rejected the self-defense instruction.
On appeal, Coapland argues “some” of the evidence adduced by the state would
have nevertheless supported a self-defense instruction; namely, the victim’s testimony
“that [the victim] first pushed Mr. Coapland, then Mr. Coapland swung at him [with] the
knife while [the victim] simultaneously swung at Mr. Coapland with a closed fist.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.22 (emphasis added).) This argument fails, both with respect to the
push and the punch.
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First, Coapland fails to show any evidence that he had a “reasonable fear of some
level of bodily harm” because he was pushed by the victim. See Hansen, 133 Idaho at
329, 986 P.2d at 352. The victim testified that he saw Coapland holding a knife, and
because the victim was understandably “concerned for [his] safety,” he pushed Coapland
away in an attempt “to get [Coapland] away from” him. (Tr., p.117, L.14; p.119, Ls.1322.) But the push was not even forceful enough to cause Coapland, who was “pretty big,”
to fall down. (Tr., p.100, Ls.12-13; p.120, Ls.18-20.) As a result, Coapland fails to show
that a garden-variety push would have caused him any “fear of some level of bodily
harm,” much less a reasonable one. See Hansen, 133 Idaho at 329, 986 P.2d at 352.
Moreover, even assuming a push would cause such a reasonable fear, Coapland
has not shown that his response—stabbing the victim in the stomach—was anywhere near
“reasonable force to resist the use of excessive force.” See Garner, 159 Idaho at ___, 367
P.3d at 724–25 (emphasis added). By any view of the facts, defending oneself from a
push by stabbing a victim in the stomach—such that there was “bowel eviscerated from
the abdomen,” creating a “very high risk for sepsis and infection and death”—would not
be a reasonable response. (See Tr., p.149, Ls.5-10; p.153, L.20 – p.154, L.3.)
Second, with respect to the punch, the state disputes Coapland’s timeline, and
specifically disputes that the victim threw the punch and Coapland swung the knife
“simultaneously.” (See Appellant’s brief, p.22.) The victim testified that following the
push, Coapland “swung [the knife] with his left hand”; then, the victim’s “eyes locked on
to it, and I knew the blade was coming”; and at that point the victim then responded by
throwing a punch. (Tr., p.120, L.14 – p.121, L.1.) The eyewitness to the event likewise
testified he saw Coapland “taking a swing at [the victim] and then [the victim] responded
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in self-defense” by hitting Coapland.

(Tr., p.167, Ls.8-15; p.168, Ls.3-9 (emphasis

added).) None of the testifying eyewitnesses who remembered the event contradicted the
knife-first, punch-second timeline. Because the evidence showed that Coapland swung
the knife first, and then the victim threw a punch, by temporal necessity Coapland cannot
show that swinging the knife would have been a reasonable response. 2
Even assuming, contrary to the evidence presented below, that the punch and the
stabbing were “simultaneous” (see Appellant’s brief, p.22), Coapland cannot show that
the punch justified a reasonable fear of bodily harm—because even if the two acts
happened simultaneously, by definition, Coapland had already decided to swing his knife
before the punch could have caused any reasonable fear.

Furthermore—under any

timeline—even assuming Coapland has shown that the punch caused him fear of bodily
harm, he has not shown that his response—stabbing the victim in the stomach—was a
reasonable quantum of force under the circumstances.
Because Coapland fails to show there was any evidence that he acted in selfdefense, he has failed to show the district court erred by denying his request to instruct
the jury on self-defense.

D.

Any Error In Not Giving A Self-Defense Instruction Was Harmless
Alternatively, even if the district court erred in not instructing the jury as to self-

defense, any error was harmless. As explained above, no evidence supported a self-

2

Ironically, the evidence only shows the punch was a reasonable defensive measure
deployed by the victim, in response to the imminent stabbing. (See Tr., p.167, Ls.13-15.)
18

defense theory of the case. Coapland’s testimony consisted of speculation about why he
would have done the thing he had no memory of doing. (See, e.g., Tr., p.203, L.11 –
p.204, L.2; p.205, Ls.19-25; p.208 Ls.5-12; p.216, L.16-25.) The state’s evidence—
showing Coapland responded to a push by stabbing the victim in the stomach—did not
show that Coapland had a legally viable self-defense claim.

There was simply no

evidence that would have supported a finding that Coapland acted in self-defense and
therefore any error in failing to give a self-defense instruction was necessarily harmless.
Because a self-defense theory had no evidentiary support, it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the verdict was unaffected by the lack of a self-defense instruction.
Even if the failure to instruct the jury on self-defense was an error, it was harmless, and
this Court should affirm.

III.
Coapland Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error
Coapland argues an accumulation of errors requires reversal of his convictions.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-25.) Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of
errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair
trial. “However, a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of
more than one error.” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 149, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014)
(quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2008)).

Because

Coapland has failed to show any error, there is no error to cumulate in this case.
Alternatively, even if errors in the trial had been shown, they would not amount to a
denial of due process requiring reversal. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d
907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct.
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App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless). Coapland has failed to show any
cumulative error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Coapland’s judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 28th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Kale D. Gans______________________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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